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COMMENTS
THE INCONSISTENCY OF VIRGINIA'S EXECUTION OF
THE NPDES PERMIT PROGRAM: THE FORECLOSURE OF
CITIZEN ATTORNEYS GENERAL FROM STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS*
"The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."'
"It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to pre-
vent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development
and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement)
of land and water resources ... .2
"Public participation in the development, revision, and enforce-
ment of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or
program established by the Administrator or any State under
this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by
the Administrator and the States."3
* This paper was selected as a winner of the first University of Richmond
Water Law Writing Competition.
The author would like to thank Roy Hoagland of the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation for supplying information for this article, and John M. Holloway 1H for
his helpful comments.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:715
I. INTRODUCTION
The above mentioned goals and policies of the Clean Water
Act4 suggest that Congress intended to create a partnership
between the federal government, state governments, and the
public to help abate pollution of the nation's waters. This intent
is illustrated by the fact that permits issued to dischargers of
pollutants into navigable waters5 can be issued by either the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)6 or a state agency.7
Unfortunately, the goal of public involvement is lost in "the
confusion caused by this poorly drafted and astonishingly im-
precise statute."8 The resulting inconsistent system forecloses
some members of the public from participating in segments of
the pollution abatement process. Virginia's implementation of
the Clean Water Act serves as a prime example of this hidden
inconsistency.
The EPA delegated authority under the CWA to Virginia to
grant NPDES permits in 1975.' This permit scheme is com-
monly referred to as the Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
4. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)) [hereinafter CWA].
5. "The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). This section states that "the Governor of each State
desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters
within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete descrip-
tion of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under
an interstate compact. .. ." Id. The Act specifies certain requirements which the
state application must include before the Administrator can delegate federal adminis-
tration of the CWA to the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b)(1)-(9). The specific requirements
will be discussed infra parts II-IV.
8. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
9. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Environmental Defense Fund, Petition
for Corrective Action, An Order Commencing Withdrawal Proceedings, and Other Inter-
im Relief With Respect to Virginia's Water Pollution Control Program, 1 n.1 (Nov. 5,
1993) (submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, Philadel-
phia, Pa.) (copy on fie with the University of Richmond Law Review) [hereinafter
CBF Petition]; see also Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Permit and En-
forcement Programs Between the State Water Control Board and the Regional Admin-
istrator, Region III, Environmental Protection Agency (Mar. 31, 1975) (copy on file
with the University of Richmond Law Review) [hereinafter Memorandum of Under-
standing].
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tion System (VPDES).'0 In the past few years, several environ-
mental organizations and municipalities have been critical of
Virginia's permitting program. In 1993, two coalitions of citizen
groups and municipalities submitted separate petitions to the
EPA asking the agency to withdraw Virginia's permitting au-
thority under the Clean Water Act." The petition submitted
by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the Environmental De-
fense Fund (CBF Petition) maintained that the poor quality of
Virginia's navigable waters was caused by barriers to citizen
standing to challenge water discharge permits issued by Virgin-
ia.' Much of this concern stems from the arguably poor condi-
tion of Virginia's water resources.'"
Environmental organizations argue that the Virginia State
Water Control Board (SWCB) has failed to adequately execute
its duties.'4 Furthermore, these organizations have faced diffi-
cult challenges in surmounting the statutory scheme under
which the SWCB operates. Because of this statutory scheme,
Virginians who have sought judicial review of SWCB issuance
of VPDES permits have been shut out of Virginia's courts. Vir-
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19:3(A) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1994). Historically,
the Virginia State Water Control Board (SWCB) has administered the VPDES. The
SWCB has recently been absorbed into the Department of Environmental Quality. For
the sake of consistency, this paper will continue to refer to the SWCB as the permit-
ting agency.
11. See CBF Petition, supra note 9; Southern Environmental Law Center, et. al.,
Petition for Relief on Virginia's VPDES Program, (Aug. 10, 1993) (submitted to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I, Philadelphia, Pa.) (copy on file
with the University of Richmond Law Review) [hereinafter Southern Environmental
Law Center Petition].
12. See generally CBF Petition, supra note 9. The CBF Petition describes
Virginia's restrictive standing requirements as "antithetical" to citizen input in viola-
tion of the Clean Water Act. The Southern Environmental Law Center Petition, supra
note 11 at 2, using stronger language, describes Virginia's limits to citizen standing
as "illegal" under the Clean Water Act.
13. See Virginia Water Quality Assessment for 1992: § 305(b) Report to EPA and
Congress, Virginia Water Control Board Information Bulletin #588 (Apr. 1992). The
report states that 55% of Virginia's biological monitoring stations registered from "im-
paired" to "severely impaired" water. Id. at app. A. Also, Virginia bans fishing or
advises against the consumption of fish from 458 miles of river within the state. Id.
at 3.2-3 to 3.2-4.
14. See, e.g., CBF Petition, supra note 9, at 4 ('he Virginia Water Control Board
assessed only $304,590 in administrative penalties during mid-89 to mid-91. By con-
trast, in one Clean Water Act case alone, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation succeeded
in obtaining a penalty of almost $300,000.") (citing CBF v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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ginia is the only state that grants standing only to dischargers
to challenge the issuance or denial of a discharge permit issued
by the state. 5 This lack of access to the courts remains one of
the more difficult challenges to Virginians seeking to act as
citizen attorneys general. The CBF Petition has yet to receive a
final determination by the EPA, but it has experienced some
success in initiating increased federal review of Virginia's water
pollution discharge permitting system. 6
This paper explores the difference between federal implemen-
tation and Virginia's implementation of the Clean Water Act's
permitting requirements, and how Virginia can "legitimately"
place severe limitations on citizen standing to challenge water
discharge permits. Part II of this paper explains the permitting
process under the Clean Water Act. This section also discusses
the relevant portions of Virginia's water control laws which
pertain to the permitting process. Part III discusses federal
judicial review of EPA actions on NPDES permits and
Virginia's restrictive standing requirements to challenge water
discharge permits issued by the State Water Control Board.
Part IV discusses original and federal question jurisdiction in
federal courts to review NPDES permits issued by state agen-
cies. This includes an explanation of why non-applicants in
Virginia cannot challenge permits issued by Virginia in federal
court. Part V discusses why this scheme may not be desirable,
and how the situation can be remedied on three different levels.
Part VI serves as the conclusion of this paper.
II. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE PERMITTING PROCESS
AND VIRGINIA'S PERMITTING PROGRAM
A. Effluent Limitations and Water Quality Standards
In the 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act, 7 Con-
15. See CBF Petition, supra note 9, at 14-17. Besides Virginia, only New Mexico
restricts standing to "owners." Id. at 17 n.47 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-6-5(N)
(Michie 1993)). However, New Mexico is a non-delegated state and the EPA adiminis-
ters New Mexico's NPDES program. Therefore, "any interested person" in New Mexico
could challenge a permit in federal court. Id.; see also infra part III.A.
16. See infra part V.C.
17. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
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gress compromised between the absolutist effluent standards
approach to regulation with the relativist water quality ap-
proach. 8 This regulatory approach combines a limitation on
end of pipe discharges with water quality standards for the
waters receiving the discharge, and serves as the basis for the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System found in Sec-
tion 402 of the Act.'
The Clean Water Act establishes that it is unlawful for any
person 0 to discharge21 any pollutant 22 into the navigable wa-
ters of the United States except as in compliance with the
Act.' The CWA allows discharges of pollutants by a person
from a point source' under certain circumstances. Section 301
86 Stat. 816 (1972).
18. WILLAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONmENTAL LAw 260 (2d ed. 1994). Rodgers
contends that this compromise evolved from the absolutist effluent limitation approach
of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425 sec. 10, 30 Stat. 1151 (current version
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407, 411 (1988)) and the relativist water quality approach of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, ch. 750, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948). Id. at 252-54. For a discussion of the philosophical conflict between these two
concepts, see id. at 259-62.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
20. '7he term 'person' means an individual, corporation, partnership, association,
State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5)(1988).
21. The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge of pol-
lutants" each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable wa-
ters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the wa-
ters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other
than a vessel or other floating craft.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
22. "The term 'pollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. §
1362(6). This provision has been interpreted broadly to include all manner of waste
material. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (holding that
ordnance dropped during naval exercises was a pollutant despite the district court's
determination that the ordnance caused no harm to the receiving waters).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). This basic premise of the Clean Water Act was
borrowed from the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 361-
62. For a historical background of the Clean Water Act and its precursors, the Feder-
al Water Pollution Act and the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, see
id. at 252-54; J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENviRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 177-80
(10th ed. 1989).
24. "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or yes-
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of the Act requires the EPA Administrator to set federal efflu-
ent limitations25 which require the "application of the best
available technology economically achievable."26 Section 304
places special emphasis on toxic pollutants. 7 The Act requires
the Administrator to "take into account the toxicity of the pol-
lutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential
presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the impor-
tance of the affected organisms and the nature and extent to
which effective control is being or may be achieved under other
regulatory authority" when determining whether to prohibit
discharge of the toxic pollutant or when setting the effluent
limitation.28
In addition to the effluent limitation approach of section 301,
the CWA incorporates a water quality approach 9 and water
quality related effluent limitations." Water quality standards
are established either upon submission of a standard by a
state3 or promulgation by the Administrator.2 If the effluent
standard established by section 301 would "interfere with the
attainment or maintenance of that water quality in a specific
portion of the navigable waters," the Administrator must set
new effluent limitations "for such point source or sources...
which can reasonably be expected to contribute to the attain-
ment or maintenance of such water quality."33 The water qual-
sel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
25. "The term 'effluent limitation' means any restriction established by a State or
the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, bio-
logical, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable
waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of com-
pliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1988).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1988). Congress has specifically listed 65 toxic pollut-
ants. 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVTL. L. § 3.03(4)(g) (Release No. 36, Nov.
1994). This list was later subdivided into 129 pollutants for 21 basic industries. Id.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2). In this vein, Congress established two goals: (1) to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants in the navigable waters by 1985; and (2) to
promote, "wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for
the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recre-
ation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(2)
(1988).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(C).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a). The effluent standard established by the Administrator
720 [Vol. 29:715
VIRGINIA'S NPDES PERMIT PROGRAM
ity approach integrates the state's designation of the planned
use of the water body, and requires the Administrator to ap-
prove the state's use designation if it comports with the appli-
cable requirements of the CWA.' The designated uses typical-
ly include waters suitable for recreation, propagation of fish,
other aquatic and semi-aquatic life, and transportation of sew-
age and industrial wastes without nuisance. 5 Section 304(l)
requires states to identify both water quality uses that cannot
be achieved from existing effluent standards for toxic pollut-
ants" and specific control strategies which will sufficiently
reduce concentrations of toxic pollutants to achieve the water
quality standard for the receiving waters."
B. The Permitting Scheme
1. The Federal Permitting System
Before a person may discharge pollutants from a point source
into any navigable waters in the United States, that person
must apply for and obtain a discharge permit.38 This permit-
ting system, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES), authorizes the Administrator to issue permits to
any person for the discharge of pollutants upon the condition
that the discharger meet the "best technology" effluent require-
ments set out in Section 301.3' Before issuing the NPDES per-
must "assure protection of public health, public water supplies, agricultural and in-
dustrial uses, and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of shell-
fish, fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water... ." Id.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(B). If a state fails to submit proposed water quality
standards within the time allotted by the Act, the Administrator must promulgate
water quality standards for that state. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b)(1).
35. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 344. The EPA published an illustrative set of
guidelines for water quality criteria in 1973. Id. at 344, n.7 (citing General Water
Quality Criteria, in U.S. EPA GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING OR REVISING WATER
QUALrrY STANDARDS UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972 23 (Apr. 1973)).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(A)-(C) (1988).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(D).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(1988). Congress borrowed this permitting system from
the Army Corps of Engineers regulatory scheme under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, ch. 425, sec. 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)). 1 GRAD,
supra note 27, § 3.03(6)(a).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
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mit, the Administrator must conduct a public hearing" and
determine that the discharge will comply with the applicable
requirements of the CWA.4" The discharger must satisfy the
effluent limitations, water quality related effluent limitations,
water quality standards, the national standards of performance
for new sources,42 toxic and pretreatment effluent standards,
and ocean discharge criteria.' The permit prescribes the condi-
tions which the permittee must meet in order to comply with
the permit."
2. Virginia's Permitting Scheme
Virginia's water control law resembles the federal act. Virgin-
ia prohibits waste discharges into the ambient waters within its
jurisdiction unless the discharger obtains a permit.45 The Code
grants the State Water Control Board (SWCB) the authority to
establish "standards of quality and policies for any state wa-
ters."" The SWCB may also impose standards more stringent
than federal standards after submission of the more stringent
standards to the standing committees in each house of the
General Assembly with jurisdiction over such matters."' The
40. Id. "Any person may submit oral or written statements and data concerning a
draft permit. Reasonable limits may be set upon the time allowed for oral statements,
and the submission of statements in writing may be required." 40 C.F.R. § 124.12(c)
(1994). A hearing officer presides over this public hearing, and the public comments
received during the public comment period required by 40 C.F.R. § 124.10 are includ-
ed as part of the public hearing record. 40 C.F.R. 124.12(a)(4). At the close of the
public hearing period, the Regional Administrator decides whether to issue or deny a
permit application. 40 C.F.R. § 124.15 (1994). Any interested person may request a
formal hearing within 30 days of the Administrator's determination. 40 C.F.R. §
124.74(a) (1994).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1988). The national standards of performance apply to "new
sources," and require new sources to apply the "best available demonstrated control
technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives, including, where prac-
ticable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants." 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1)-(2).
These standards apply to a minimum of 26 industries. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(c).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2). These conditions include a requirement that the per-
mittee collect and report data and information on the discharge. Id. The Administra-
tor can also set "other requirements as he deems appropriate." Id.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.5 (Michie 1992).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3a) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1994).
47. Id.
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SWCB can grant a permit to dischargers, and the permit must
be of a fixed term of no more than five years.48 An "owner ag-
grieved" by any action of the Board may demand a formal hear-
ing if no formal hearing preceded the Board's action.4 9 The
SWCB conducts hearings on permits either by a regular or
special meeting of the whole Board or by "at least one member
of the Board designated by the chairman to conduct such hear-
ing on behalf of the Board.... 50
C. Delegation of NPDES Permitting Authority to States and
Virginia's Delegated Authority
1. The Requirements for Delegation
To promote its policy of preserving and protecting "the prima-
ry responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution,"5 Congress gave states the option of ad-
ministering their own permit program.52 The Governor of a
state which desires to administer its own permit program must
submit to the EPA "a full and complete description of the pro-
gram it proposes to establish and administer under State law
or under interstate compact." 3 The Act also requires the state
attorney general, or the attorney for the state agency responsi-
ble for water pollution control, to submit a statement verifying
that the laws of the state or the interstate compact "provide
adequate authority to carry out the described program."'
Once the Administrator receives the submissions by the Gov-
ernor and the attorney general, she must approve the petition
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(5)-(5a) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1994). The statute
refers to permits as "certificates," but for purposes of consistency, "certificates" will be
referred to as "permits" in this paper.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.25 (Michie 1992). For a discussion of the definition
of the words "owner aggrieved," see infra part HI.B.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.26(A) (Michie Cur. Supp. 1994). "A verbatim record
of the proceedings of such hearings shall be taken and filed with the Board." Id. §
62.1-44.26(B). Also, the Board has the power to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum. Id. § 62.1-44.26(C). The Board is required to issue such subpoenas at the
request of any party. Id.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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of the state unless certain requirements are not met.55 These
requirements list affirmative duties that the state must have
the apparent authority to fulfill under the program. For the Ad-
ministrator to approve the state proposal, the state must have
the authority to issue permits that comply with the following
requirements: the state must be able to issue a permit that (a)
can apply and insure compliance with sections 301, 302, 306,
307, and 403 of the Act;5  (b) is for a fixed term of no more
than five years;57 (c) "can be terminated or modified for cause"
for a violation of a permit condition, misrepresentation or fail-
ure to disclose in obtaining the permit, or "change in any condi-
tion that requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or
elimination of the permitted discharge;"" and (d) can "control
the disposal of pollutants into wells."59
The CWA further requires that states fulfill specific require-
ments in administration of its permit program before the Ad-
ministrator can delegate the permitting authority to the state.
The Act requires the Administrator to determine whether the
state can fulfill the inspection, monitoring, and record-keeping
requirements of section 308.60 The state must provide public
notice and provide opportunity for a public hearing before mak-
ing a final decision on a permit application,61 as well as notify
any other state "whose waters may be affected by the issuance
of a permit."62 Notice and copies of each permit application
must be forwarded to the Administrator. 3 The state must in-
sure that no permit will be issued if the Secretary of the Army
(acting through the Army Corps of Engineers) determines that
"anchorage and navigation of any of the navigable waters would
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)-(9).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A). The applicable sections include § 301's effluent
limitations, § 302's water quality standards, § 306's national standards of performance
for new sources, § 307's toxic and pretreatment effluent standards, and § 403's ocean
discharge criteria. See supra part II.A_
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (1988).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2)(A)-(B).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5). The affected state must be allowed to "submit written
recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any
permit application. .. ." Id.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(4).
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be substantially impaired thereby."64 The state must also in-
sure that: (1) permits issued to publicly owned treatment works
satisfy pretreatment standards for toxic pollutants;6 (2) indus-
trial users of the publicly owned treatment works comply with
the proportional payment requirements of section 204(b) and
the toxic effluent and pretreatment standards;66 and (3) viola-
tions of the permit conditions or the permit program are en-
forced through civil and criminal penalties.
67
In keeping with its objective to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters, 8 Congress gave states the option to set more stringent
standards than federal standards.69 Also, the Act prohibits
state and federal permitting programs from "anti-backsliding,"
which means that "a permit may not be renewed, reissued, or
modified ... to contain effluent limitations which are less
stringent than the comparable effluent limitations in the previ-
ous permit, 70 unless the permit falls under certain excep-
tions."'
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(6).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(9). The proportional payment requirements of section
204(b) state, in pertinent part, that:
[The Administrator shall not approve any grant for any treatment works
under section 1281(g)(1) of this title . . . unless he shall first have deter-
mined that the applicant (A) has adopted or will adopt a system of
charges to assure that each recipient of waste treatment services within
the applicant's jurisdiction ... will pay its proportionate share . . . of
the costs of operation and maintenance . . . of any waste treatment ser-
vices provided by the applicant....
33 U.S.C. § 1284(b)(1) (1988).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988). Section 510 of the Act states that state actions to
"enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution . . . " are not precluded
unless the effluent standard, or control or abatement requirement, are less stringent
than the federal requirements. Thus, by negative implication, a state may set stan-
dards more stringent than the federal standards.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2). These exceptions allow for increased discharges in a
renewed, reissued or modified permit if the facility undergoes "material and substan-
tial alterations or additions" that occurred after the permit issuance. Id. §
1342(o)(2)(A). Also, the discharger may seek a modified, renewed or reissued permit
for higher discharge levels if either: (1) information not available at the time of issu-
ance would have allowed for less stringent effluent limitations, or (2) the permittee
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2. Memorandum of Agreement and Waiver
The regulations that implement the delegation requirements
state that there must be a "Memorandum of Agreement" be-
tween the state and the Regional Administrator of the EPA. 7
2
The agreement must include, inter alia, "provisions specifying
classes and categories of permit applications, draft permits, and
proposed permits that the State will send to the Regional Ad-
ministrator for review, comment and, where applicable, objec-
tion.""3 The agreement must also include agreement on com-
pliance monitoring,74 and must "specify the extent to which
EPA will waive its right to review, object to, or comment upon
State-issued permits under section 402(d)(3), (e) or (f) of
CWA."75 Section 402 allows the Administrator to waive her
right to object to the issuance of a permit76 and to waive her
right to be notified of a permit application or the issuance of
that permit by the delegated state.77 According to Professor
Rodgers, "[t]he waiver provisions . . . obviously are of no small
moment since they represent gaps in the knowledge of the EPA
regional offices that are irreparable despite regrets or second
thoughts.""
3. Virginia's Memorandum of Agreement with the EPA
Virginia entered into an agreement with the EPA on March
31, 1975 to perform the permitting and enforcement programs
under the CWA.79 This agreement grants Virginia the respon-
sibility of issuing all waste discharge requirements under the
acted in accordance with the previous permit, but was unable to meet the conditions
of the previous permit. Id. § 1342(o)(2)(B)-(E).
72. 40 C.F.R. § 123.24 (1994).
73. Id. § 123.24(b)(2).
74. Id. § 123.24(b)(4).
75. Id. § 123.24(d).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3) (1988). The Administrator may object to the issuance of
a permit issued by a state within ninety days of being notified of the proposed per-
mit. Id. § 1342(d)(2). If the Administrator objects, the permit will not issue. Id.
77. Id. § 1342(e) (incorporating by reference § 1342(d)).
78. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 366-67.
79. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 9. The Code of Regulations gener-
ically refers to the agreement as a "Memorandum of Agreement." See 40 C.F.R. §
123.24 (1994).
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NPDES50 and enforcing the terms of the permits under the
discharge permits."' The agreement requires Virginia to trans-
mit copies of all draft NPDES permits to the EPA Regional
Administrator within thirty days of receipt by the SWCB"
The Regional Administrator may comment on or object in
writing to the sufficiency of the draft permit within 'thirty days
after receipt of the draft permit.83 To object to the draft per-
mit, the Regional Administrator must transmit the nature of
his objections to SWCB with an explanation and support for the
objections." If the Regional Administrator does not submit ob-
jections within the thirty-day (or fourteen-day) time limit, the
Regional Administrator waives the right to comment."5 When
the Administrator objects to the issuance of a permit and trans-
mits her objections to the SWCB, the Board must notify the
"Administrator, in writing, prior to the issuance of any proposed
NPDES permit of the disposition of any recommendations and
or objections of the Regional Administrator which have not been
incorporated in the proposed permit."" The agreement, howev-
er, does not require the SWCB to adopt any recommendations
submitted by the Regional Administrator in objection to a draft
permit.
In accordance with the waiver provisions of the CWA,8" Vir-
ginia and the EPA agreed that the EPA would waive its right
to comment and object to the waste discharge requirements
contained in certain NPDES permits. These permits involve
discharges from publicly owned treatment works, other waste
discharges, and discharges that only pass cooling water.8 In
80. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 9, at I.1.
81. Id. at 11.2.
82. Id. at III.6.a.
83. Id. at UI.6.b. These requirements do not apply to the review of draft permits
that the Regional Administrator has waived his right to review. Id. at VI.l.a. If,
however, the permit concerns new sewage discharges, the Regional Administrator
must object to or make recommendations within 14 days. Id. at m.6.b.
84. Id. at Ifl.6.c. These objections must state "the reason that the requirements
[in the draft permit] conflict with the Act or regulations and guidelines adopted
thereunder. . . ." Id.
85. Id. at m1I.6.b.
86. Id. at llI.6.c.
87. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(e) (1988).
88. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 9, at VI.l.a. The EPA also agreed
to waive its right to receive monitoring reports, to object to proposed changes in
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order for the waiver provision to be applicable, the discharges
must not exceed certain maximum daily discharge flow rates. 9
These waiver provisions do not apply to discharges that: "[1]
affect the waters of an adjacent state, and/or [2] ... contain
toxic substances in excess of standards promulgated by the
Administrator of EPA pursuant to Section 307(a) of the Act,
and/or [3] ... [flow from] 'Interim Treatment Facilities'" con-
structed after the commencement of the agreement. ° The
agreement allows the Regional Administrator to unilaterally
terminate the waiver in whole or in part.9'
D. Withdrawal of Permitting Authority From a State
The delegation of NPDES permitting authority to a state is
not, in theory, permanent. Upon the application of an interested
person, the Administrator may commence withdrawal proceed-
ings to remove the state's permitting authority. 2 If the "Ad-
ministrator determines after a public hearing that a State is
not administering a program" as required by section 402, she
may withdraw the state's permitting authority.9 The Adminis-
trator may conduct an informal investigation into the petition's
allegations, and if she determines that "cause exists to com-
mence proceedings," she may order a hearing. 4 She must sub-
mit the allegations to the state against whom the allegations
monitoring reports, and to "receive notices regarding compliance or non-compliance
with permit conditions, schedules and/or limitations" for these specific waste discharg-
es. Id.
89. These maximum discharge flow rates include:
[F]or: (1) publicly owned treatment works involving discharges or pro-
posed discharges with an average flow equal to or less than 0.5 MGD
[million gallons a day]; (2) all other discharges or proposed discharges
with an average flow equal to or less than 0.1 MGD; (3) all discharges
equal to or less than 1.0 MGD which involve discharges or proposed
discharges consisting only of pass cooling water ....
Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at VI.2. The Administrator must submit the notice of termination in
writing to the SWCB. Id.
92. 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1) (1994). The Administrator must respond to the peti-
tion in writing. Id.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1988).
94. 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1).
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are alleged, and the state must respond in writing within thirty
days.
9 5
Once the state answers the allegations, the party seeking
withdrawal has the "burden of coming forward with the evi-
dence in a hearing."96 If, after the public hearings, the Admin-
istrator determines that the state has failed to administer the
program as required, she must notify the state of any appropri-
ate corrective actions the state must take in order to maintain
its permitting authority.9 7 If the state does not act within a
reasonable time not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator
may withdraw the program after notifying the state and mak-
ing public her reasons for such withdrawal in writing.98
IH. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EPA AND SWCB ACTIONS
ON NPDES PERMITS
The CWA provides for judicial review of EPA decisions to
issue, modify, or deny a NPDES permit.9 The Virginia Code
also provides for judicial review of SWCB decisions to issue,
modify, or deny a VPDES permit."' However, the right to
challenge EPA actions on NPDES permits stands in stark con-
trast to the right to challenge VPDES permits in Virginia's
courts. As the following discussion illustrates, the CWA grants
citizen attorneys general a more expansive right to challenge
EPA actions on NPDES permits than the Virginia Code allows
to challenge VPDES permits in Virginia's courts.
A. The Right of Review of EPA Actions on NPDES Permits
Clean Water Act section 509(b)(1) states, that "any interested
person" may seek review of final EPA action as it relates to the
issuance or denial of a NPDES permit in a Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals.'0 ' The term "interested person" has been
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
98. Id.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1988).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Michie 1992).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). The section states, in pertinent part:
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broadly construed to mean any person."2 The interested per-
son must seek review where the interested person lives or
transacts business, and where the agency action would directly
affect that person."3
B. The Right of Review of SWCB Action on VPDES Permits
The Virginia Code permits any "owner aggrieved" by a final
decision of the SWCB to seek judicial review of that action
under the provisions of the Virginia Administrative Process Act
(VAPA).' VAPA entitles "[a]ny person affected by and claim-
ing the unlawfulness of any regulation, or party aggrieved by
and claiming unlawfulness of a case decision" to judicial review
of that agency action in "any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.""°5 However, a contradiction exists between the term
"owner aggrieved" found in the state water control law and the
term "party aggrieved" found in VAPA. This contradiction has
Review of the Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any standard of
performance under section 1316 of this title, (B) in making any determi-
nation pursuant to section 1316(b)(1)(C) of this title, (C) in promulgating
any effluent standard under section 1317 of this title, (D) in making any
determination as to a State permit program submitted under section
1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limita-
tion or other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this
title, (F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 1342 of this
title, and (G) in promulgating any individual control strategy under sec-
tion 1314(1) of this title, may be had by interested person in the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in
which the person resides or transacts business which is directly affected
by such action upon application by such person.
Id.
102. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 14 n.23 (1981) ("The review provisions of § 509 are open to '[amny person,'
and thus provide an additional procedure to 'private attorneys general' seeking to en-
force the Act. . . .") (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1971), reprint-
ed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Michie 1992) (incorporating by reference the
Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:1 to .14:25 (Michie
1993)).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16(A) (Michie 1993). The venue for such proceedings
is governed by VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-261. That section states, inter alia, that the
court of competent jurisdiction to review agency action is located in the city or county
where the petitioner resides or conducts substantial business or the city or county
where the agency is located. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-261(1)(a)(1)-(3) (Michie Cum. Supp.
1994).
VIRGINIA'S NPDES PERMIT PROGRAM
made it impossible for non-permit holders or applicants to chal-
lenge SWCB actions that issue or deny VPDES permits.
Two Virginia Court of Appeals cases illustrate this point. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Control
Board,"6 the plaintiff sought review of SWCB reissuance of a
VPDES permit to Rocco Farms, Inc., a poultry processing plant
located in Shenandoah County, Virginia.0 7 The Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) attended a public hearing and submitted
oral and written comments stating concerns about the draft
permit.' Once the Board reissued the permit, EDF requested
a formal hearing before the Board to challenge the Board's
amendment of the permit.09 The Board denied the petition,
stating that EDF did not have standing to request a formal
hearing."0 EDF brought an action for review of the SWCB is-
suance of the permit in the Richmond Circuit Court, but that
court also held that EDF did not have standing to challenge the
permit."'
The court of appeals also ruled that EDF did not have stand-
ing under VAPA or the State Water Control Law. The court
reasoned that the applicable section of VAPA"2 did not sup-
plement the standing requirements of the basic law (the water
control law)." "The purpose of Code § 9-6.14:16 is to 'stan-
dardize court review ... save as laws hereafter enacted may
otherwise expressly provide.'"" The court found it dispositive
that Code § 9-6.14:3 provides that VAPA "does not supersede or
repeal additional procedural requirements in [the water control
law]."" Thus, since the water control law provided a specific
106. 404 S.E.2d 728 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
107. Id. at 729.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 729-30. The plant already possessed a permit, but sought a flow-tiered
permit that would allow it to increase discharges when water levels increased. Id. at
729. EDF felt that the permit violated the "anti-backsliding" provisions of SWCB reg-
ulations and the CWA. Id. at 730. For a discussion of the federal "anti-backsliding"
requirements, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
110. 404 S.E.2d at 730.
111. Id.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16 (Michie 1993).
113. 404 S.E.2d at 731.
114. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:3).
115. Id.
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standing requirement, the VAPA standing requirement was
inapplicable.116
The court then applied the more restrictive "owner aggrieved"
standing requirement of Code § 62.1-44:16 to EDF, rather than
the less restrictive "party aggrieved" requirement found in Code
§ 9-6.14:16.1' The state water control law specifically defined
the word "owner" to include a person
that owns, operates, charters, rents, or otherwise exercises
control over or is responsible for any actual or potential
discharge of sewage, industrial wastes, or other wastes to
state waters, or any facility or operation that has the capa-
bility to alter the physical, chemical, or biological properties
of state waters in contravention of § 62.1-44.5.118
In effect, this gives only permit holders or applicants the right
to seek judicial review of a Board's decision to issue or deny a
permit application. Thus, EDF, acting in its representative
capacity for non-permit holders and non-applicants, had no
standing to seek review of the Rocco Farms permit in a Virgin-
ia state court. 9 The court also held that EDF did not have a
right to a formal hearing since Code § 62.1-44.25 provides that
only "owners" possess the right to request a formal hearing.'
In Town of Fries v. State Water Control Board," the court
faced a similar situation to that of Environmental Defense
Fund. In Town of Fries, the town, a civic organization, individu-
al landowners, and a local business challenged the issuance of a
VPDES permit by the SWCB to the City of Galax. 2 The City
of Galax requested an amended permit to build a sewage treat-
ment plant which would discharge pollutants into the New
River directly upstream from the Town of Fries.' The Town
116. Id. at 732.
117. Id.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3(5) (Michie 1992).
119. 404 S.E.2d at 732.
120. Id. at 732-33.
121. 409 S.E.2d 634 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
122. Id. at 635-36.
123. Id.
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of Fries intended to use the water from the New River as a
source of drinking water."4
The court, following Environmental Defense Fund held that
the Town of Fries and the other parties were not "owners ag-
grieved" and thus, had no standing to seek review of the
agency's issuance of the VPDES permit. ' Expanding on its
decision in Environmental Defense Fund, the court cited Virgin-
ia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Ap-
peals, 6 to state that the term "aggrieved" means the "appel-
lant must show that he has an immediate pecuniary and sub-
stantial interest in the litigation, and not a remote or indirect
interest."' The court also stated that the Town of Fries was
acting to challenge an "anticipated public injury, which the
court in Virginia Beach Beautification held was an insufficient
ground to establish standing."'
The decisions in Town of Fries and Environmental Defense
Fund illustrate the seemingly impossible standing requirements
that citizen attorneys general must meet to challenge VPDES
permits in Virginia state courts. These decisions require that
two tests be satisfied before a person can challenge SWCB
action on a VPDES permit: (1) the person must be an "owner"
as defined in the state water control law; and (2) the person
must have been "aggrieved," meaning they must show an imme-
diate pecuniary and substantial interest in the litigation, as
opposed to a remote or indirect interest. These standards make
challenging SWCB action on a VPDES permit exceedingly diffi-
cult.
IV. ORIGINAL AND FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND
REVIEW OF STATE-ISSUED NPDES PERMITS
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the CWA grants
standing to citizens to seek judicial review of EPA's grant or
124. Id. at 637.
125. Id. at 636-37.
126. 344 S.E.2d 899, 902 (Va. 1986).
127. 409 S.E.2d at 637 (quotations omitted).
128. Id.
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denial of an NPDES permit,'2 9 while Virginia grants standing
to review SWCB decisions to issue or deny a permit only to
permit holders or applicants."' As a state delegated to issue
NPDES permits, Virginia is the only delegated state to limit
standing to challenge the issuance or denial of a discharge
permit only to dischargers."' In light of Congress' goal to in-
clude "[p]ublic participation in the development, revision and
enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation,
plan or program established by the Administrator or any
State," "2 this difference creates at least pause for consider-
ation. The question is obvious. If the CWA grants "any interest-
ed person" standing to review EPA action to issue or deny a
permit under the NPDES, how can a state prohibit a person
from obtaining standing to challenge a substantively similar
decision by the SWCB?
A. Federal Circuit Courts and Original Jurisdiction
In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,"' the United States
Supreme Court hinted at an answer to this question. In a foot-
note, the Court stated that 'EPA's failure to object, as opposed
to its affirmative veto of a state-issued permit, would not neces-
sarily amount to 'Administrator's action' within the meaning of
[CWA] § 509(b)(1)."" Although this statement was not ger-
mane to the case, the court was citing with approval Mianus
River Preservation Committee v. EPA."' In Mianus River, the
petitioners sought review in the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals of a NPDES permit modification issued by the Connecti-
cut Department of Environmental Protection." 6 The Second
Circuit held that the court had jurisdiction to review NPDES
permits under section 509(b)(1) only if the EPA Administrator
129. See supra part III.A.
130. See supra part III.B.
131. See supra note 15.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1988).
133. 445 U.S. 193 (1980) (per curiam).
134. Id. at 197 n.9.
135. 541 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1976).
136. Id. at 900. The petitioners sought review of DEP's grant of a modification of
Greenwich Water Company's permit to discharge chemically treated flocculants into
the Mianus River. Id.
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had exercised action on the permit.'37 Thus, since the Con-
necticut DEP issued this permit under its delegated authority,
and since no "Administrator action" was involved, the court did
not have jurisdiction.'38
The Second Circuit rejected two arguments advanced by the
petitioners. The petitioners argued that (1) in issuing NPDES
permits, the DEP acted as the Administrator's agent, thus ren-
dering DEP action "an action of the Administrator through a
delegation of authority," and (2) the Administrator's failure to
reject or "veto" the permit constituted "Administrator action" for
purposes of section 509 review.'39 The Second Circuit rejected
both arguments. First, the court stated that the process for
approval of a state program and the elimination of a federal
program "creates a separate and independent State authority to
administer the NPDES pollution controls, in keeping with the
stated Congressional purpose to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent,
reduce and eliminate pollution."' The court found that the
legislative history of the CWA supported the proposition that
Congress intended the state program to be a separately admin-
istered program in which the Administrator should only be in-
volved if absolutely necessary.''
137. Id. at 902.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 902-03.
140. Id. at 905 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)); accord Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978). In Shell Oil, the court stated that:
[Niothing "in the Act suggest[s] the existence of an agency relationship
between the Administrator and a state so that the latter's action in issu-
ing or denying a permit could be deemed [an] action of the Administra-
tor. To the contrary [§ 1342] makes clear that once the state has secured
approval of its own permit program, its actions in permit matters are
those of the state itself, subject to the Administrator's veto."
Id. at 412 (quoting Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1978)).
141. See 541 F.2d at 908. The Court quoted the following language for support of
this proposition:
The Committee considered extensively the proposition that all the permits
issued by the States ought to be subject to review and possible veto by
the Administrator. During the Committee's hearings, the Governors and
other representatives of the States, almost unanimously, stressed the
need to put the maximum responsibility for the permit program in the
States. They deplored the duplication and second guessing that could go
on if the Administrator could veto the State decisions. The Committee
believes that the States ought to have the opportunity to assume the
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The Second Circuit summarily rejected the petitioner's second
argument. The court stated that this situation did not cause the
Administrator to become "inextricably involved in the issuance
of the State permit."
In a case similar to the one at bar, but one in which the
plaintiff alleged that a State agency had merely "rubber
stamped" an EPA permit recommendation, the District
Court for the Northern District of California held that "the
mere failure to disapprove a state administrative action
cannot be deemed decision-making by a federal body."'
Thus, the court determined that no federal "Administrator ac-
tion" existed upon which the federal circuit court of appeals
could base jurisdiction to review the NPDES permit.'"
Generally, federal courts have held that they do not have
original jurisdiction to review state-issued water discharge per-
mits.' The courts have advanced two basic rationales for re-
responsibilities that they have requested. If, however, a State fails to
carry out its obligations and misuses the permit program, the Adminis-
trator is fully authorized under subsection (c)(3) of this section to with-
draw his approval of a State program.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
142. Id. at 909.
143. Id. (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1976)).
144. Id. at 909-10.
145. See American Paper Inst. Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989); District
of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Virginia State Water Control
Bd., 495 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Va. 1980). But cf. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,
445 U.S. 193 (1980) (holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 to review EPA actions that
were functionally similar to a denial of a state-issued permit). The Seventh Circuit
distinguished Crown Simpson in American Paper Institute, stating that:
The challenge brought in Crown Simpson preceded the 1977 amendments
to FWPCA which empowered the EPA to issue its own permit if the
state refused to modify its proposed permit. The Supreme Court, howev-
er, reviewed the challenge after FWPCA was amended [in 1977]. Because
the law applicable to the Crown Simpson challenge did not include the
Clean Water Act amendment of 1977, the Supreme Court declined to
"consider the impact, if any, of this amendment on the jurisdictional
issue presented."
890 F.2d at 874 n.7 (citations omitted). The court further stated that the EPA objec-
tions to a state-issued permit are no longer functionally equivalent to denying a per-
mit since 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988) gives EPA the authority to take over permitting
authority from the state on the objectional permit. 890 F.2d at 874.
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fusing jurisdiction in these cases. The first rationale involves
the theme of state and local primacy in enforcement of the
water pollution control laws. "In light of the pervasiveness of
this theme, the specific references to the veto power... and
the conferral of broad discretion to waive review of individual
permits,"' the courts have readily recognized that state-is-
sued permits fall within the ambit of state law.' Tangential-
ly, advice given by the EPA when it objects to a state-issued
permit does not constitute final agency action upon which feder-
al court jurisdiction can be grounded.'
The second rationale that the courts express for the proposi-
tion that state-issued permits are not reviewable in federal
courts involves the result of such a system. In American Paper
Institute, Inc. v. EPA, the Seventh Circuit held that federal
judicial review of a state-issued NPDES permit would create
"an undesired bifurcated system whereby both state and federal
district courts would hear challenges to state NPDES permits
issued after EPA objection." 5 ° The court found no support in
the CWA for the proposition that the CWA requires such a
bifurcated system.'5 ' Also, since the "Act demonstrates an in-
tent for the EPA and the states to work through differences in
permitting decisions to accomplish" the goal of state primacy in
water regulation, the court held that the EPA's discretion in ob-
jecting to state-issued permits precluded judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act.
52
146. Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1294 (5th Cir. 1977).
147. Id.
148. See Shell Oil Co., 585 F.2d at 414. In Shell Oil, the court stated that:
[A] holding that statutorily sanctioned advice by the EPA to a state
agency constitutes final federal agency action reviewable in the federal
courts would permit an applicant, dissatisfied with a decision of a state
board, to circumvent the appellate process envisioned by the statute and
bestow jurisdiction upon a federal court simply by alleging coercion or
undue influence.
Id.
149. 890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989).
150. Id. at 875.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701); accord Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282,
1295 (5th Cir. 1977). Section 701 of the APA states, in pertinent part, that "(a) tt]his
chapter (for judicial review of agency actions) applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that . .. (2) agency action is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988).
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At least one court has argued that there are two exceptions
to the general rule that EPA failure to veto a state-issued per-
mit is not reviewable in a federal court. In Save the Bay, Inc. v.
EPA,'53 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that limited
judicial review in the federal district courts of the EPA's failure
to veto a state permit could be granted: (1) if the EPA failed to
consider and veto a permit that violates applicable federal
guidelines, or (2) if the EPA considered impermissible factors,
such as political popularity of the decision, in deciding not to
veto a permit.TM The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
criticized this decision in District of Columbia v. Schramm,'55
saying that the court "doubt[ed] that Congress intended federal
court review in these situations."'56 Given the discretionary
nature of the EPA's power to veto state-issued permits, the
court in Schramm presents the better reasoned approach under
the present CWA.5 7
B. Federal District Courts and Federal Question Jurisdiction:
Implying a Cause of Action
One may argue that, although the federal circuit courts may
not possess original jurisdiction to review NPDES permits is-
sued by a delegated state, the federal district courts do possess
"federal question" jurisdiction to review such matters.'58 Under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal districts courts "have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." 59
153. 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977).
154. Id. at 1295-96. Although this issue was not before the court, the court stated
that its conclusion raised a number of issues that would have to be decided again at
a later date. Id. at 1292. Therefore, the court held that "[c]onsiderations of judicial
economy" required determination of the issue, as the issue would have to be raised in
the district court on remand. Id.
155. 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
156. Id. at 861 n.12.
157. The dates of these two decisions support part of this conclusion. Save the Bay
was decided before the 1977 Amendments to FWPCA, whereas Schramm was decided
after the 1977 Amendments. For a discussion of how these amendments affected the
EPA's discretionary power, see American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 874-
75 (7th Cir. 1989). See also supra note 147.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). For a more comprehensive explanation of federal
question jurisdiction, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.3 (1989).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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[A] case arises under federal law if it is apparent from the
face of the plaintiffs complaint either that the plaintiffs
cause of action was created by federal law; or, if the
plaintiffs cause of action is based on state law, a federal
law that creates a cause of action is an essential component
of the plaintiffs claim.160
In order to invoke federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff
must satisfy a three prong test. First, a federal question must
be clear from the face of the plaintiff's complaint.'61 Second,
the case arises under federal law if the federal law creates a
cause of action. 2 Third, when the plaintiff does not allege a
federal law cause of action, a federal question may exist "if it is
clear from the face of the plaintiffs complaint that a federal
law that creates a cause of action is an essential component of
the plaintiffs state law claim."'
Against this backdrop, the federal courts have grappled with
whether federal question jurisdiction gives district courts the
power to review state-issued discharge permits which the EPA
has failed to veto. Judge Merhige of the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia encountered this specific issue in
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Virginia State Water Con-
trol Board.'
CBF challenged the issuance of a VPDES permit by the
SWCB to the Hampton Roads Energy Company.'65 The court
stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 permitted federal question juris-
diction to determine if the State Board had satisfied the mini-
mum requirements for issuing an NPDES permit.'66 Therefore,
the case involved a federal question. However, because the
CWA did not expressly grant federal district courts jurisdiction
to review state NPDES permits, the requirements of federal
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 160, at 231.
161. Id.; see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
162. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 160, at 236.
163. Id. at 237.
164. 495 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Va. 1980).
165. Id. at 1230. CBF was joined in its suit by Citizens Against the Refinery's
Effects (CARE), a corporation organized under Virginia law.
166. Id. at 1233. Judge Merhige tepidly determined that the court could exercise
federal question jurisdiction by stating that "the Court is cognizant and respectful of
the state character of Virginia's NPDES program." Id.
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question jurisdiction dictated that a cause of action had to be
implied from the statute.'67 To determine whether the CWA
contained such an implied cause of action, the court applied the
four part test found in Cort v. Ash.'68
First, the court stated that the CWA was intended to benefit
the plaintiffs because Congress defined the CWA's goal as being
the restoration and maintenance of the integrity of the Nation's
navigable waters.'69 However, under the second prong, the
plaintiffs failed to point to any clear expression of congressional
intent to create a federal cause of action. In fact, an examina-
tion of Congress' intent showed the contrary. 7 ° Under the
third prong, the court held that each of the policies and goals
enumerated under section 101 of the CWA were not mutually
exclusive, and that "[t]he Act's purpose, then, was to combat
water pollution problems through a 'delicate partnership' of the
state and federal governments."' Fourth, the court found
that the CWA, as written, was intended to be within the realm
of state law.'7' After balancing the Court v. Ash factors, Judge
Merhige concluded that a federal cause of action could not be
implied to challenge state NPDES permit decisions. 73
The goal of expressly recognizing the "primary responsibilities
and rights of the states to prevent, reduce and eliminate
pollution"'74 coupled with the state's historical role in water
regulation did not lead the court to conclude that Congress
167. Id. at 1234.
168. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Supreme Court identified several factors that are
germane to the determination of the existence of an implied cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third,
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law.?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
169. 495 F. Supp. at 1235.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1236.
172. Id. at 1237.
173. Id. at 1237-38.
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
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intended the Act to supplant state law. 75 In explaining this
position, Judge Merhige expressed some specific concerns about
the role of federalism:
There is a second area of traditional state concern which
plaintiffs did not address and which clearly raises issues of
federalism. That concern is the administration and super-
vision of a state's executive agencies. Implying a federal
cause of action under the circumstances of this case would
substantially undermine the efficacy of the state adminis-
trative process. As a practical matter, the exercise of the
purported federal cause of action would also present pen-
dent state law claims. The federal district courts would
then be forced to assume a general review position over the
state agency. An intrusion of that magnitude cannot be
easily countenanced."
In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n,'" the Supreme Court held that the Clean
Water Act did riot contain an implied cause of action. Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, gave three basic justifications for
this holding. First, under the factors identified in Cort v.
Ash,' 5 the legislative history of the CWA indicated that Con-
gress did not intend for private remedies to be implied in the
Act."'79 Second, the CWA provisions for citizen enforcement 8
and citizen review of EPA actions' 8' indicate Congress' intent
to expressly provide a broad but defined cause of action.8
Third, the savings clause in section 505" referred to other
175. 495 F. Supp. at 1237.
176. Id.
177. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
178. 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see supra note 168.
179. Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 17-18.
180. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). This provision grants the district courts jurisdic-
tion over suits filed by "any citizen" against "any person" alleged to be in violation of
an effluent standard or order issued by the EPA of a state, or a suit against the
EPA for failure to perform any non-discretionary duty as required by the Act. Id.
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1988).
182. Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 16-17.
183. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988). The section states that "[n]othing in this section
shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or
to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agen-
cy)." Id.
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statutes, not the CWA, and thus did not imply any causes of
action not contained in the statute." 4
The federal courts have consistently held that Congress did
not intend the CWA to contain an implied cause of action.'"
Under the federal question analysis contained in 28 U.S.C. §
1331, challenges to the sufficiency of water discharge permits
clearly do not present a federal question. The CWA contains no
express provision for citizens to challenge water discharge per-
mits issued by state agencies. Therefore, the judicial construc-
tion of the CWA prohibits district courts from invoking their
federal question jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of
state-issued NPDES permits. Citizens seeking to challenge the
issuance of NPDES permits must seek resolution of that chal-
lenge in state court.'
V. THE REMEDIES
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that non-
permit holders in Virginia who wish to challenge the issuance
of a VPDES permit have no remedy in state8 or federal"
court. This fact raises several of the concerns that led to the
nationalization of pollution standards in the Clean Air Act'89
184. Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 16-17. In support of this proposition, the Court
quoted the following from the legislative history of the 1972 FWPCA Amendments: "It
should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or
remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies
would remain available." Id. at 16 n.26 (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746).
185. See, e.g., id.; American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 874 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("Precedent strongly suggests that there is no general implied private
cause of action to challenge EPA objections under the Act."); District of Columbia v.
Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 726 F.Supp. 1404, 1410 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Chesapeake
Bay Found. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 495 F. Supp. 1229, 1234-38 (E.D.
Va. 1980).
186. See, e.g., Schramm, 631 F.2d at 863; Consolidated Edison Co., 726 F. Supp.
at 1410; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. IM. 1988).
187. See supra part III.B.
188. See supra part IV.
189. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7671q (Supp. III 1991)). Eleven separate Acts of
Congress are buried in the Clean Air Act. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 124. The first
comprehensive version of the Act that included national air quality standards was the
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and Clean Water Act in the early 1970s. 90 By allowing a
state to deny citizens standing to challenge a permit issued
under the guidelines of a federal statute, where that same
person would have standing to challenge a similar permit in a
sister state, Virginia's implementation of the Clean Water Act
raises the specter of the "race of laxity" which existed before
the 1970s nationalization of minimum pollution standards. 9'
Although the CWA requires the state to uphold federal effluent
limitations, "a state agency is more likely to pay attention to
the interests of permit applicants who can take their grievances
to court, than it is to others who have equally important inter-
ests but no recourse to the courts." 2
In order for private citizens to gain the right of review any
interested person possesses when the EPA administers the
NPDES program, 93 some changes must occur in the admin-
istration of Virginia's permitting authority. Three possible solu-
tions exist: (1) amend the CWA to require states to give citi-
zens standing in order to have the state permitting program ap-
proved for delegation; (2) change Virginia's standing laws to
accommodate citizen attorneys general; or (3) withdraw the
Virginia program and allow the EPA to run the program.
1970 amendments. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
190. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENViRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOciETY 727 (1992).
191. Id. at 726-27. The authors describe pre-1970's environmental regulation as fol-
lows:
Exacerbating local pressures for non-enforcement of environmental laws
was the ominous threat of industrial flight from states that vigorously
enforced environmental protection laws. As the national infrastructure
and methods of transport of commodities improved, industries could con-
vincingly threaten to relocate to avoid local conditions that were unfavor-
able-e.g. high taxes, high labor costs, unionization, or environmental
controls that imposed high pollution control costs. States wishing to at-
tract industries to bolster their local economies competed to attract firms
by engaging in what some observers called "the race of laxity" in envi-
ronmental protection laws.
Id.
192. Southern Environmental Law Center Petition, supra note 11, at 13.
193. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1988); see also supra note 101; supra part III-A
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A. Amend the Clean Water Act
As previously discussed,14 the Administrator must deter-
mine whether a state has adequate authority to comply with
the requirements of the CWA before she can delegate permit-
ting authority to the state.'95 The CWA lists a number of re-
quirements that the state must fulfill before delegation can
take place. 9 ' The Clean Water Act does not require states to
grant citizens standing to challenge water discharge permits in
state court. However, Congress could amend the CWA to in-
clude a citizen standing provision in the delegation require-
ments.'97
Congress has legislated in this area before by requiring
states to grant citizen access to state courts as a part of the
state's requirements to receive permitting authority. The Clean
Air Act contains a provision that requires approved state pro-
grams to provide "an opportunity for judicial review in State
court of the final permit action by the applicant, any person
who participated in the public comment process, and any other
person who could obtain judicial review of that action under
applicable law."9 ' The processes of granting state permitting
authority under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act are
194. See supra part II.C.1.
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
196. Id.
197. To draft such a provision would not be difficult. The best approach would be
to add a subpart to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), which outlines the requirements that state
permit programs must fulfill in order to receive delegated authority. This additional
subpart could be drafted as follows:
The Administrator shall approve each submitted program unless he deter-
mines that adequate authority does not exist: ... (10) To insure that
any interested person have an opportunity for judicial review in a State
court of competent jurisdiction of the final permit action by the applicant,
any person who participated in the public comment process, and any
other person who could obtain judicial review of that action under appli-
cable law.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (1988). The Clean Air Act requires the Administrator
to promulgate regulations establishing minimum standards for a permit program to
be administered by "any air pollution control agency." 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b). The Act
also requires the Governor of each state to develop and submit a proposed permit
program to implement the Act, and provides sanctions if the state fails to submit a
permit plan. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d). Section 7661a(b) lists the requirements that an air
pollution control agency must meet in order to issue air pollution permits. This list of
requirements resembles the requirements for state permit programs under the CWA.
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similar.'99 Thus, the Clean Air Act serves as an instructive
model upon which Congress can base amendments to the Clean
Water Act's citizen standing provisions as they pertain to state-
issued NPDES permits.
The difficulty with amending the Clean Water Act to resem-
ble the standing provision in the Clean Air Act discussed above
lies in the concepts of federalism that Judge Merhige voiced
concern for in Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State
Water Control Board.°0 Such an action would require states
to incorporate administrative procedures as required by federal
law. Although states would retain the authority to determine
what standard of review that courts would employ, the seem-
ingly popular concept of "states rights" would probably over-
come any argument in support of this amendment. Considering
the present political climate, such an amendment would receive
little support.2 '
B. Change Virginia's Standing Laws
A recent report of the Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission (JLARC) to the Virginia General Assembly stated
that Virginia overly restricted citizen access to state courts, and
that more access should be given to persons seeking review of
agency decisions."02 The Commission found that eighty-six per-
cent of the administrative law attorneys it surveyed felt that
judicial review, as implemented in Virginia, provided for stabili-
ty and finality to administrative agency factfinding. °3 Howev-
199. See id.
200. 495 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Va. 1980); see supra part IV.B.
201. See Kenneth J. Cooper, House Votes to Curb Unfunded U.S. Mandates, WASH.
POST, Feb. 2, 1995, at Al. Governors and local officials in several states have argued
that federal water pollution regulations instituted by the EPA have caused states to
incur large expenses without any federal monies to alleviate the costs. Id. This "un-
funded mandates" legislation was one of the targets of the Republican candidates for
the House of Representatives, as stated in their "Contract with America." Id. Some
have argued that the "unfunded mandates" legislation "will restore state and local
governments to their true places as partners in our federal system...." Id. (quoting
Rep. William F. Clinger, Jr.).
202. REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEw COMMISSION, Review of
Virginia's Administrative Process Act, H. Doc. No. 51, at 91-97 (1993) [hereinafter
JLARC REPORT].
203. Id. at 90.
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er, only forty-seven percent of those surveyed agreed that "judi-
cial review, as implemented in Virginia provides a high degree
of protection to the public from potentially arbitrary or capri-
cious agency case decisions. "2°4 The JLARC Report proposed
several changes to the state water control law and VAPA to
reduce restrictions on standing to challenge water and air per-
mits issued by the state.
The JLARC Report proposed that VAPA amended to clarify
when the basic law precludes VAPA."5 For instance, VAPA
states that its provisions "[do] not apply to any agency action
which (i) is placed beyond the control of the courts by constitu-
tional or statutory provisions expressly precluding court re-
view.""' The water control law states that "[a]ny owner ag-
grieved by a final decision of the Board . . . is entitled to judi-
cial review thereof in accordance with the provisions of the
[VAPA]." 2 °7 As the JLARC Report points out, the words in the
water control law do not "expressly preclude" the VAPA, but
rather incorporates the statute.0 8 However, the Virginia state
courts have held that the water control law precludes judicial
review under VAPA."9 The JLARC Report proposed that
VAPA be amended to ensure that VAPA judicial review provi-
sions are only excluded when the General Assembly expressly
states that VAPA is superseded by the basic law.21°
The Commission recommended that the General Assembly
change the word "owner" to "person" aggrieved in the state
204. Id.
205. Id. at 92-93.
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:15 (Michie 1993).
207. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Michie 1992).
208. JLARC REPORT, supra note 202, at 93.
209. See, e.g., Town of Fries v. State Water Control Bd., 409 S.E.2d 634 (Va. Ct.
App. 1991); Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 404
S.E.2d 728 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
210. JLARC REPORT, supra note 202 at 94. The report gave the following expla-
nation for this proposal:
As a matter of policy, access to judicial review could be considered a
fundamental check against unlawful agency actions. Therefore, it may be
desirable to provide clearly and consistently in VAPA that agency basic
law can only restrict judicial review of VAPA agency actions where that
intent is explicitly stated in the basic law, and cannot do so by implica-
tion.
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water control law.21' Furthermore, the Commission recom-
mended that the word "aggrieved" be defined to include both
"imminent injury" and "non-economic injury."2" These two
changes, taken together, would clarify and expand the holding
of Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning
Appeals.2" According to the report, these changes would allow
persons substantially affected by the issuance of a water or air
permit to challenge the issuance of that permit.214
Finally, the Commission recommended that the General As-
sembly grant standing for persons to challenge agency actions
when those persons participate in the public comment
process."1 This requirement would grant citizens standing in-
dependent of whether they are injured by agency action. This
requirement would emulate the standing approach taken by the
Clean Air Act and EPA regulations.21
The proposals in the JLARC Report would alleviate the cur-
rent problems with standing to challenge VPDES permits in
Virginia. These changes would broaden the class of potential
plaintiffs by including more persons who can challenge agency
action. Also, the amended meaning of the word "aggrieved"
would permit a person who received a non-pecuniary or immi-
nent injury to redress that injury. Furthermore, representative
citizen groups who provide public comment would be able to
gain standing to challenge agency actions. These changes would
help ensure that citizens would have "recourse for inequities
and injuries resulting from unlawful agency actions."21
211. Id. at 95 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §62.1-44.29 (Michie 1992)).
212. Id. at 95-96.
213. 344 S.E.2d 899 (Va. 1986); JLARC Report, supra note 202, at 95.
214. JLARC REPORT, supra note 202, at 96. The JLARC Report lists several illus-
trations of persons who presently would not be able to challenge water and air per-
mits issued by Virginia but would be able to challenge the permits with these pro-
posed changes. Those illustrations include "'parents of children who attend a school
immediately downwind' from a toxic polluter," "a 'municipality which takes its drink-
ing water immediately downstream' from a river contaminated by discharges;" "an
'asthmatic who suffers health effects' from air pollution;" and "recreational users (hik-
ers, campers, fishermen)' of a park near the discharge facility." Id.
215. Id. at 96-97.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 90.
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C. Withdrawal
Withdrawal of a state water program by the EPA constitutes
a drastic measure. "Many of the same forces that lead to even-
tual state program approvals create formidable obstacles to
takebacks of authority. The procedures for withdrawal of state
programs would be suitable for the Nuremburg trials, and will
be invoked only upon epochal occasions."218 Because of the dis-
ruptive and demeaning nature of such an action, the EPA and
state governments typically try to avoid such an outcome to
preserve peaceful coexistence of the state and federal govern-
ments." 9
Although withdrawal appears to be unlikely in light of the
prevailing regulatory and political climate, the CBF Petition
illustrates how a petition for withdrawal can produce positive
results. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation recently received a
letter from the EPA's Region III Office stating that the EPA
was taking specific actions while it reviewed CBF's withdrawal
petition."' The letter states that the EPA has drafted a pro-
posed rule to address the judicial standing requirements that
apply to state water programs which will soon be published.22" '
The Region III Office is also revising its oversight approach to
evaluate Virginia's NPDES permitting program.2 Finally, the
Region III Office stated that it wanted to ensure meaningful
opportunities for the public to "follow up on major comments on
proposed permits submitted during the public notice period."2"
To meet this goal, the Region III Office plans to "establish a
process under which it will review any proposed permit where a
significant comment has been submitted and a member of the
public requests EPA to follow-up on that comment."" This
218. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 367-68 (footnote omitted).
219. See id. at 368.
220. Letter from Robert Perciasepe, EPA Assistant Administrator & Peter H.
Kostmayer, EPA Regional Administrator, to William C. Baker, President, Chesapeake
Bay Foundation (Jan. 24, 1995) (on file with the University of Richmond Law Review)
[hereinafter EPA Letter].
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id. The Region III Office plans to take this action in accordance with Section
II18(d) of the current Memorandum of Understanding between EPA and Virginia. Id.
For a discussion of Virginia's Memorandum of Understanding with EPA, see supra
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approach will provide an additional forum in which interested
persons can "[raise] and [address] permit concerns until the
standing issue is resolved."2"
The Region III Office's initial approach will not necessarily
give Virginia citizens standing to challenge VPDES permits.2 8
However, these approaches create a second level of review upon
which SWCB actions, theoretically, will be scrutinized by a
third party who will be responsive to public comments. Also, as
the EPA continues to review the CBF Petition, the EPA will be
collecting evidence and gaining an informed understanding of
the VPDES program. This information will help the EPA make
final determination on the withdrawal petition, and may lead to
discussions with the state as to the efficacy of its restrictions
on citizen standing. These actions cannot replace the broad
federal standing provisions citizens would enjoy if the EPA
withdrew Virginia's permitting authority. However, discussions
between EPA and Virginia may preserve the state/federal rela-
tionship while eventually giving Virginia's citizens broader
rights to challenge VPDES permits in state courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the federalism model envisioned by Congress un-
der the Clean Water Act, Virginia has been successful in keep-
ing non-permit applicants from seeking judicial review of
VPDES permits. Virginia's restrictive standing requirements
contradict the broad federal standing provisions. However, the
federal courts addressing this issue have generally held that
state-issued permits are not reviewable in federal court.
Congress could amend the Clean Water Act to require states
to grant standing in state courts to citizens seeking review of
state agency decisions to issue or deny an NPDES permit. How-
ever, this proposal is not likely to occur in light of the present
political climate. Additionally, the EPA could grant the Chesa-
part II.C.3.
225. EPA Letter, supra note 220, at 2.
226. This assumes that the EPA will not veto VPDES permits on a regular basis.
If the EPA vetos a VPDES permit, this action would convey standing on "any inter-
ested person" as defined by the CWA. See supra part HII.A See also supra part IVA
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peake Bay Foundation's petition to withdraw Virginia's permit-
ting authority. Although the petition has received some initial
successes, the EPA is not likely to do so.
The best solution to this problem lies within the grasp of the
General Assembly. In order for Virginia's citizens to gain access
to Virginia state courts, the General Assembly must amend the
water control law to expand the present standing requirements.
As a matter of policy, this change is desirable because it allows
citizens to protect their own rights against unlawful agency
actions. Without this right, Virginia's citizens will continue to
be foreclosed from protecting their health and property because
of their inability to gain standing to challenge VPDES permits.
D. Brennen Keene
